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ON AN ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE THE 
COMPATIBILITY OF DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE 
AND HUMAN FREEDOM 
Anthony Brueckner 
Ted A. Warfield seeks to establish the compatibility in question by getting the 
incompatibilist toreject an unpersuasive argument from fatalism to the conclu-
sion that a given action is not freely done. He maintains that such a rejection 
requires the the incompatibilist to hold that there is a possible world in which 
the fatalist's premise is true and in which the conclusion is false (and so the 
given action is freely done). If a foreknowing God exists in that world, then 
incompatibilism must be rejected. I criticize this reasoning on the ground that 
one can reject a bad argument from true premises without countenancing a 
possible world in which the premises are true and yet the conclusion false. 
One position on the problem of free will is that there is no possible world 
in which some human acts freely. One might hold this, for example, in 
virtue of thinking that both determinism and indeterminism rule out free-
dom. Call that view -OF. Surely a proponent of -OF can recognize the 
weakness of a certain fatalistic argument against freedom. The premise 
that it was true in 50 AD that Plantinga climbs Mt. Rushmore in 2000 AD 
tells us nothing about whether the ascent is done freely.l Of course, the -OF 
theorist will hold that the climb in question is not an example of free 
human action, for reasons that have nothing to do with the fact that the 
proposition that Plantinga climbs Mt. Rushmore in 2000 AD is always true. 
The -OF theorist might incautiously express his rejection of the fatalistic 
argument in question by holding that these two propositions are consistent: 
(A) Plantinga freely climbs Mt. Rushmore in 2000 AD. 
(B) It is true in 50 AD that Plantinga climbs Mt. Rushmore in 2000 
AD. 
If he expresses his rejection in that way, then Ted A. Warfield will be quick 
to say that the -OF theorist holds an overall position that is self-contradicto-
ry.2 If A and B are consistent, Warfield will say, then there is a possible 
world in which both propositions are true. But in that world, some human 
acts freely, contrary to -OF. 
But surely the -OF theorist should be II free" to reject some unpersuasive 
argument from acceptable premises to the conclusion that no human acts 
freely without having to agree that there is a possible world in which the 
premises are true and the conclusion false! His view is that there is no possi-
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ble world in which the conclusion is false (i.e., in which A is true). 
Bearing these points in mind, suppose that we encounter a philosopher, 
Divinco, who shares the -OF theorist's disdain for the fatalistic argument. 
Divinco believes that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human 
freedom, and he believes that God is omniscient and foreknowing in every 
possible world. So Divinco shares the -OF theorist's opinion that there is no 
possible world in which humans act freely. 
Warfield seeks to parlay Divinco's rejection of the fatalistic argument into 
a commihnent to the compatibility of freedom and foreknowledge.3 His strat-
egy is to claim that in order to reject the reasoning from the eternal truth of 
propositions to human unfreedom, one must hold that there is a possible 
world in which A and B are both true. But that will be a world in which, 
according to a philosopher like Divinco, God exists and foreknows every 
human action, including Plantinga's 2000 AD ascent. And it will be a world 
in which A is true-in which Plantinga freely climbs.' Thus, Warfield says, 
divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible. That is, they 
areshown to be compatible, Warfield says, relative to Divinco's assumption 
that a foreknowing, omniscient God exists in all possible worlds. Warfield 
points out (section VI) that this sort of argument cannot be used against an 
incompatibilist who holds that some possible worlds lack an omniscient 
God. He also maintains that the argument cannot be used to show that 
determinism is compatible with human freedom. This limitation depends 
upon there being possible worlds in which some events are not causally 
determined. Thus, a (putative) world in which A and B are both true need 
not be a world in which Plantinga's climb is causally determined. It is worth 
noting, however, that if determinism holds in all possible worlds (as might 
be maintained by someone who holds a version of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason), then Warfield's reasoning, if cogent, could be used to show the 
compatibility of determinism and freedom. 
Warfield's attempt to show that divine foreknowledge and human free-
dom are compatible is unsuccessful. The moral of the foregoing story of the 
-OF theorist is that rejecting the fatalistic argument does not force one to 
hold that there is a possible world in which the argument's premise is true 
and its conclusion false (i.e., a world in which A and B are both true). On 
Divinco's view, there is no possible world in which its conclusion is false 
(i.e., in which A is true). 
Philosophers often argue about the truth value of propositions which, if 
true, are necessarily true. A philosopher may find himself in the position of 
thinking that P is true and necessary, while wondering whether a certain 
argument from acceptable premises provides good reasons for believing 
that P. If such a philosopher finds the considered argument wanting, then 
this need not depend upon his thinking that there is a possible world in 
which the premises are true and yet the conclusion-P-is false. Even 
though he finds the argument in question wanting, he still believes (maybe 
for other good reasons) that P is true and necessary. Similarly, I might well 
reject a purported proof (from acceptable assumptions) of a mathematical 
proposition M which I believe, even though I do not for a moment hold 
that there is some possible world in which the "proof's" assumptions are 
true and yet M is false. 
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So now we can see that it was not, after all, crucial to Warfield's reason-
ing that he consider the fatalistic argument from the eternal truth of propo-
sitions. He could equally well have considered any other bad argument 
from acceptable premises to the conclusion that Plantinga does not freely 
climb. By Warfield's reasoning, if Divinco rejects the bad argument, then 
this commits him to there being a possible world in which A and the bad 
argument's premises are true. But then Divinco must accede to the compat-
ibility claim, since, on his view, God foreknows Plantinga's climb in the 
world in question. 
I conclude that compatibilism about freedom and foreknowledge cannot 
be as easily conjured as Warfield would have us believe.5 
University of California, Santa Barbara 
NOTES 
1. See, e.g., Peter van Inwagen's An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), chapter two, for a critical discussion of the fatalistic 
argument. 
2. See his "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom Are 
Compatible", Nous 31:1 (1997), pp. 80-6. 
3. See "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom Are Compatible". 
4. I have simplified Warfield's reasoning a bit. See his section IV. 
5. I would like to thank C. Anthony Anderson for a helpful discussion of 
these issues. 
